Permutation games: Another class of totally balanced games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: OR Spektrum
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0171-6468,1436-6304
DOI: 10.1007/bf01721088