Persistence is Power
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
In this paper, we construct a simple model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercis...
متن کاملDe Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence
Much of the empirical work and the conceptual discussion of the impact of institutions on economic development either implicitly or explicitly assumes that institutions persist. Although Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide evidence that constraints on the executive persist, many aspects of institutions change frequently. Less-developed countries cycle between democracy and dictatorship and often cha...
متن کاملPersistence of Power: Repeated Multilateral Bargaining
We develop a model of repeated multilateral bargaining that links cycles via the identity of the agenda setter. In sharp contrast to the standard history-independent equilibrium predictions, in an experiment, we observe stable and persistent coalitions in terms of member identity, allocations to coalition partners, and agenda-setter identity. Our results call into question the validity of restr...
متن کاملPersistence of locality in systems with power-law interactions.
Motivated by recent experiments with ultracold matter, we derive a new bound on the propagation of information in D-dimensional lattice models exhibiting 1/r^{α} interactions with α>D. The bound contains two terms: One accounts for the short-ranged part of the interactions, giving rise to a bounded velocity and reflecting the persistence of locality out to intermediate distances, whereas the ot...
متن کاملNber Working Paper Series Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions
We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de fa...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Japan Institute of Electronics Packaging
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1343-9677,1884-121X
DOI: 10.5104/jiep.14.p5