Persistence probability of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Probability
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0021-9002,1475-6072
DOI: 10.1017/jpr.2019.50