Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium
There is a noted passage in the history of Greece, which may serve for our present purpose. Themistocles told the Athenians, that he had form’d a design, which wou’d be highly useful to the public, but which ’twas impossible for him to communicate to them without ruining the execution, since its success depended entirely on the secrecy with which it shou’d be conducted. The Athenians, instead o...
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It is not easy to say what a thought experiment (TE) in science is and what role it is supposed to play: is it essentially an experiment or essentially an exercice in thought? There are, however, clear examples: Galileo’s reasoning about motion, Newton’s bucket, Einstein’s elevator, Schrödinger’s cat, etc. TE seem to have their proper home in philosophy, which is widely held to be a discipline ...
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In the paper, I defend the viability and importance of conceptual analysis to philosophical inquiry. My argument proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I argue that we rely on the notions guiding how we do and would apply our terms in order to evaluate the counterfactual conditionals we find at the heart of philosophical thought-experiments. In a second step, I argue that our notions determine...
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1. What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Midwest Studies in Philosophy
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0363-6550,1475-4975
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00154.x