Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pillage games with multiple stable sets
We prove that pillage games [Jordan, 2006, “Pillage and property”, JET] can have multiple stable sets, constructing pillage games with up to 2 n−1 3 stable sets, when the number of agents, n, exceeds four. We do so by violating the anonymity axiom common to the existing literature, instead endowing some agents to overpower all but a small number of opposing configurations of agents. Thus, when ...
متن کاملStable sets in three agent pillage games∗
We consider pillage games as in Jordan [2006, “Pillage and property”, JET] and show that, for anonymous, three agent pillage games: when the core is non-empty, it must take one of five forms; all such pillage games with an empty core represent the same dominance relation; when a stable set exists, and the game also satisfies a continuity and a responsiveness assumption, it is unique and contain...
متن کاملStrictly monotonic multidimensional sequences and stable sets in pillage games
Let S ⊂ R have size |S| > `2n−1. We show that there are distinct points {x, . . . , x} ⊂ S such that for each i ∈ [n], the coordinate sequence (xji ) `+1 j=1 is strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, or constant, and that this bound on |S| is best possible. This is analogous to the Erdős-Szekeres theorem on monotonic sequences in R. We apply these results to bound the size of a stable set in...
متن کاملA Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games
Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a ‘power function’ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pil...
متن کاملSufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
Pillage games [Jordan, 2006, “Pillage and property”, JET] have two features that make them richer than cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power externalities between coalitions; they allow resources to contribute to coalitions’ power as well as to their utility. Extending von Neumann and Morgenstern’s analysis of three agent games in characteristic...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2251274