Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality
Consider trade conducted via a platform, such as an online app store or a farmers market. The quality sellers choose for their products affects the surplus trade generates. Because the platform’s profit depends on that surplus, the platform can have an incentive to regulate quality. This is true even if quality is observable at time of purchase or if sellers can develop reputations concerning q...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/093245616x14464471185955