Political accountability and sequential policymaking
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Political accountability and sequential policymaking
We develop a model of political accountability with sequential policy making. Consistent with empirical observations, equilibrium behavior by the policymaker overemphasizes the late stages of the policy-making process. The reason is that the overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem—she is tempted to revise her retention rule in the middle of the policy-making process. If the overse...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.012