Political economy of taxation, debt ceilings, and growth
نویسندگان
چکیده
This study presents voting on policies including labor and capital income taxes public debt in an overlapping-generations model with physical human accumulation, it then analyzes the effects of a ceiling government's policy formation its impact growth welfare. The induces government to shift tax burdens from older younger generations, but stimulates accumulation may increase education expenditure, resulting higher rate. Alternatively, is measured viewpoint benevolent planner; lowering (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes possible for approach planner's allocation aging society.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0176-2680', '1873-5703']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101996