Portioning using ordinal preferences: Fairness and efficiency

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets

Efficiency and symmetric treatment of agents are the primary goals of resource allocation in environments without transfers. Focusing on ordinal mechanisms in which no small group of agents can substantially change the allocation of others, we first show that uniform randomizations over deterministic efficient mechanisms are asymptotically ordinally efficient, that is, efficient ex ante. This i...

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Multi-Unit-Demand Assignments

This note extends the single-unit-demand results of Liu and Pycia (2011) to the responsive-preferences and multiple-unit-demand framework of Pycia (2011a). ∗We would like to thank Andrew Atkeson and William Zame.

Combining Ordinal Preferences by Boosting

We analyze the relationship between ordinal ranking and binary classification with a new technique called reverse reduction. In particular, we prove that the regret can be transformed between ordinal ranking and binary classification. The proof allows us to establish a general equivalence between the two in terms of hardness. Furthermore, we use the technique to design a novel boosting approach...

Matching with Dynamic Ordinal Preferences

We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents with dynamic ordinal preferences. Despite a recent focus on designing one-shot matching mechanisms in the absence of monetary transfers, little study has been done on strategic behavior of agents in sequential assignment problems. We formulate a generic dynamic matching problem via a sequential stochastic ma...

Inequality Aversion and Efficiency with Ordinal and Cardinal Social Preferences – An Experimental Study