Post-Crisis Lesson for EMU Governance from the Principal-Agent Approach

Hyperbola of external debt: A Lesson from the Asian Crisis

The principal-agent approach to testing experts

Recent literature on testing experts shows that it is difficult, and often impossible, to determine whether an expert knows the stochastic process that generates data. Despite this negative result, we show that often exist contracts that allow a decision maker to attain the first-best payoff in the following sense: in the case in which the expert knows the stochastic process, the decision maker...

Automatic Generation of a Multi Agent System for Crisis Management by a Model Driven Approach

Considering the increasing occurrences of unexpected events and the need for pre-crisis planning in order to reduce risks and losses, modeling instant response environments is needed more than ever. Modeling may lead to more careful planning for crisis-response operations, such as team formation, task assignment, and doing the task by teams. A common challenge in this way is that the model shou...

Beyond Principal-agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations, Learning and Accountability

The success of LPF, like the success of similar populist movements that preceded it in Austria, France, Switzerland and elsewhere, raises grave questions about the legitimacy of democratic inputs to public decision making and the efficacy of public action however decided. At the very least these successes signal an impaired responsiveness of the democratic state to its electorate: a democratic ...

Principal-principal conflicts during crisis

This paper explores principal-principal conflicts in corporate governance during times of economic crisis. We address the question: What external and internal governance mechanisms can best protect minority shareholders? Drawing on 877 publicly listed large corporations with concentrated ownership in seven Asian countries and regions, we compare different control structures between family firms...