Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
When two agents with private information use a mechanism to determine an outcome, what happens when they cannot commit to their actions and to a mechanism? We study this problem by allowing agents to hold on to a proposed outcome in one mechanism while they play another mechanism and learn new information. A decision rule is posterior renegotiation-proof if it is posterior implementable and rob...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/1911157