منابع مشابه
Potential competition in preemption games
We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players’ moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each...
متن کاملPotential Competitors in Preemption Games∗
The purpose of this paper is to study the adoption of a new technology by a firm when the competitor comes into play at a random date that can be seen as her birth date. The presence of a competitor is thus only revealed when she invests. We show that there exists a unique Bayesian equilibrium that can be split into three stages. No firm will invest before a threshold T ∗ 1 even if she is born ...
متن کاملPreemption Games: Theory and Experiment
Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V −Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model’s main qualitative predictions: competit...
متن کاملPreemption games under Lévy uncertainty
We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg–Tirole’s preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader’s optimization problem has an interior solution, the leader enters at the optimal threshold of a monopolis...
متن کاملDe-synchornized Clocks in Preemption Games with Risky Prospects
We study an optimal timing decision problem where an agent endowed with a risky investment opportunity trades the benefits of waiting for additional information against a potential loss in first-mover advantage. The players’ clocks are de-synchronized in that they learn of the investment opportunity at different times. Previous literature has uncovered an inverted-U shaped relationship between ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.002