Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining
We consider a model of decentralized bargaining among three parties. Parties meet one-on-one after being randomly matched, and can sell or buy votes to one another. The party with a majority of the votes can decide to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations to capture additional rents. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which a pa...
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This paper investigates an important channel through which improved access to market information could increase the prices that producers receive from middlemen. I develop a theoretical model of trade between a farmer and a middleman which allows for the existence of different types of middlemen. The source of heterogeneity is attitudes towards fairness. I provide an empirical test of the theor...
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This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition procedure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one period in advance, the...
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The effects of changes in nominal bargaining power, the proposal selection rule and discounting in legislative bargaining outcomes are investigated. The comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model better organize behavior than does Gamsons Law (1961). However, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under Baron-Ferejohn as coalition partners refuse to take the...
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In this paper, we consider a dynamic and decentralized market modeled by a noncooperative networked bargaining game. Our goal is to study how the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the market’s efficiency and fairness. We introduce the concept of limit stationary equilibrium in a general trading network and use it to analyze how endogenous delay emerges in trade...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011