منابع مشابه
A transferable voting system including intensity of preference
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It is well-known that no voting system can be entirely fair: this is Arrow’s Theorem, which states that under a certain natural definition of fairness, the only fair voting system is a dictatorship. Thus, in democratic political systems, one expects voting paradoxes in which different voting systems give different results. We analyze the mathematical basis of paradoxes amongst a certain class o...
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Approval voting is the voting method recently adopted by the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Positional voting methods include the famous plurality, antiplurality, and Borda methods. We extend the inference framework of Tsetlin and Regenwetter (2003) from majority rule to approval voting and all positional voting methods. We also establish a link between approval voting and positional vo...
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Given a fixed set of voter preferences, different candidates may win outright given different scoring rules. We investigate how many voters are able to allow all n candidates to win for some scoring rule. We will say that these voters impose a disordering on these candidates. The minimum number of voters it takes to impose a disordering on 3 candidates is 9. For 4 candidates, 6 voters are neces...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.48092