Prevention of Exponential Equivalence in Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE)
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Prevention of Exponential Equivalence in Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE)
Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) and Dragonfly are simple password-based authenticated key exchange protocols that use a value derived from a shared password as a generator for modular exponentiation, as opposed to Diffie–Hellman key exchange, which uses a fixed value. However, it has been shown that in SPEKE, an active attacker, can examine multiple passwords in a single attemp...
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متن کاملOn the Security of the SPEKE Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
In the most strict formal deenition of security for password-authenticated key exchange, an adversary can test at most one password per impersonation attempt. We propose a slightly relaxed deenition which restricts an adversary to testing at most a constant number of passwords per impersonation attempt. This deenition seems useful, since there is currently a popular password-authenticated key e...
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In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision DiffieHellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Symmetry
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2073-8994
DOI: 10.3390/sym7031587