Price of Pareto Optimality in hedonic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price of Pareto Optimality in Hedonic Games
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of the social welfare in a socially optimal outcome and in a worst Nash equilibrium. A similar measure can be derived for other classes of stable outcomes. In this paper, we argue that Pareto optimality can be seen as a notion of stability, and introduce the concept of Price of Pareto Optimality: t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103357