Pricing Efficiency and Information Use in Risky Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Agricultural Economics
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0002-9092,1467-8276
DOI: 10.2307/1240984