Principal–Agent Problem as a Principled Approach to Electronic Counter-Countermeasures in Radar

Electronic countermeasures (ECMs) against a radar are actions taken by an adversarial jammer to mitigate the effective utilization of electromagnetic spectrum radar. On other hand, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCMs) impact ECMs so that can continue operate effectively. The main idea this article is show ECCMs involving and be formulated as principal–agent problem (PAP)—a widely studied in microeconomics. With principal agent, we design PAP optimize radar’s ECCM strategy presence jammer. seeks optimally trade off signal-to-noise ratio target measurement with cost: cost for generating radiation power pulse probe target. We suitable choice utility functions, convex optimization problem. Furthermore, analyze structure provide sufficient conditions under which optimal solution increasing function jamming observed radar; enables computation within class affine functions at low cost. Finally, illustrate formulation via numerical simulations. also use simulations study problem, wherein have mismatched information.