Private Value Takeover Auctions with Toeholds: An Experimental Study
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper presents the results of an experimental study takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent theory, we find a positive effect toeholds on bidding. Such effect, however, is lower magnitude and bidding premium function has opposite slope than theory predicts, which can be attributed both to risk aversion subjects’ tendency think their bids in relative terms. no cross-bidder toehold such result inconsistent observed if people expect opponents behave same way as they do.
منابع مشابه
Takeover Contests , Toeholds and Deterrence ∗
We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2073-4336']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020040