Private Value Takeover Auctions with Toeholds: An Experimental Study

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper presents the results of an experimental study takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent theory, we find a positive effect toeholds on bidding. Such effect, however, is lower magnitude and bidding premium function has opposite slope than theory predicts, which can be attributed both to risk aversion subjects’ tendency think their bids in relative terms. no cross-bidder toehold such result inconsistent observed if people expect opponents behave same way as they do.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Takeover Contests , Toeholds and Deterrence ∗

We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating...

متن کامل

Multidimensional private value auctions

We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the s...

متن کامل

Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study¤

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry and bidding behavior in ...rst-price independent private value auctions. In the ...rst stage N potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in an auction or to claim a ...xed outside option. At this stage all potential bidders know N, the distribution of possible values, and the value of the outside o...

متن کامل

On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study

This article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together. Possible applications include mergers, collusion and joint-bidding arrangements. The change produces a "strong" party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining "weak" bidder(s). The predicted effects include ineffi ciency, a decrease in the seller’s revenue, and higher bidders’payoffs...

متن کامل

Private-Value Auctions, Resale, and Common Value

We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) …rst-price auction model with resale and a model of …rst-price common-value auctions. The common value is de…ned by the transaction price when trade takes place. When there is no trade, the common value is de…ned through a monotonic extension of the resale price function. We show bid equivalence when (1) there are two b...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Games

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2073-4336']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020040