Privatization, investment, and ownership efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Privatization, Investment, and Competition
In practice, governments often retain some shares in the ...rms they privatize, the ensuing pro...t distributions being an additional source of revenue. We show for a two-...rm di¤erentiated-product oligopoly how partial state ownership may a¤ect ...rms’ subsequent investment and output behavior. Hence, we determine the optimum retained state ownership share under both Bertrand and Cournot comp...
متن کاملPrivatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects
This paper argues that the private-public ownership factor should be differentiated from other factors that also influence the effect of privatization on efficiency. This is empirically confirmed in a longitudinal study of 24 Spanish firms, for which several political and organizational factors are found to influence the estimated effects of privatization on efficiency. The analysis of the timi...
متن کاملManagement versus Ownership: the Road-privatization Debate
Roads are frequently cited as a public good even though economists have shown that privatizing the roads would solve some of the problems endemic to public roads, namely, high accident rates, congestion, and pollution (see Roth 1996, 1967; Block 1983, 1979, 1980). Economists have analyzed the problem of externalities and shown how the effects of freerider behavior can be contained. The question...
متن کاملMultinational Ownership and Subsidiary Investment
This paper examines how foreign ownership affects the investment decisions of subsidiary firms using a new dataset of listed-parent − listed-subsidiary pairs. We find that improvements in the investment opportunities of parent firms have a negative effect on the investment of their subsidiaries, after controlling for the investment opportunities of the subsidiary, which can be independently obs...
متن کاملMass Privatization, Management Control and Efficiency
We present a model where a government chooses the number of individuals to which ownership in a former state-owned firm shall be allocated. When making this decision the government maximizes the political support it gets from the firm’s incumbent manager and from potential shareholders, anticipating that a greater dispersion of shares reduces the control of the manager by the firm’s new owners....
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0030-7653,1464-3812
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpr053