Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers — those that cooperate and punish — are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show ...
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Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of thes...
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Human readiness to incur personal costs to punish norm violators is a key force in the maintenance of social norms. The willingness to punish is, however, characterized by vast individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. In fact, this heterogeneity has so far defied explanations in terms of individual-level demographic or psychological variables. Here, we use resting electroencephalogra...
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We introduce new treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism with opportunities to punish, to see how contributions and punishments change when (a) each dollar lost in punishment must be awarded to another team member and/or when (b) obtaining information on individuals’ contributions is a costly choice. Conjectures that tying punishments to rewards might reduce punishment of high contribu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: New Journal of Physics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1367-2630
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016