Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt of providing a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here, we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides et al., 2001) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgments experim...
متن کاملTheoretical note Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability ...
متن کاملOn the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: probability versus inductive confirmation.
Major recent interpretations of the conjunction fallacy postulate that people assess the probability of a conjunction according to (non-normative) averaging rules as applied to the constituents' probabilities or represent the conjunction fallacy as an effect of random error in the judgment process. In the present contribution, we contrast such accounts with a different reading of the phenomenon...
متن کاملIs the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?
Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted confirmation-theoretic explanation of the conjunction fallacy. I present experimental results to show that CFT’s conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the fallacy. There exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. Also, the...
متن کاملProbability judgement from samples: accurate estimates and the conjunction fallacy
This paper investigates a fundamental conflict in the literature on people’s probability estimation. Research on ‘perception’ of probability shows that people are accurate in their estimates of probability of various simple events from samples. Equally, however, a large body of research shows that people’s probability estimates are fundamentally biased, and subject to reliable and striking fall...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Thinking & Reasoning
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1354-6783,1464-0708
DOI: 10.1080/13546780701643406