Problems and Pseudo-Problems in Understanding Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Problems and Pseudo-Problems in Understanding Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
The principal aim of this article is to clarify what is and what is not problematic in understanding cooperation in the dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma game and in multiplayer social dilemmas. A secondary aim is to provide a brief overview of the most important proposals for solving the genuine problems. Our commentary on the very interesting target article (Krueger, DiDonato, & Freestone, this issue...
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known recently as the Brain Report. And what a terrible anti-climax the fruit of all these Vears of study turns out to be. Bad enough in itself; but worse still the fact of the quite reverential reception is has been accorded in the various corridors of power. That it should be receiving serious consideration in governmental circles I find frightening indeed. God help us all if some of the reco...
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Previous findings on punishment have focused on environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this paper, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in a two-person stochastic prisoner’s dilemma environment where each person can decide whether or not to cooperate and the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. In partic...
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In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Psychological Inquiry
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1047-840X,1532-7965
DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2012.658003