Procurement Auctions with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Procurement Auctions with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach
Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or risk attitudes, then equilibrium predictions can perform poorly. In this paper, we confront laboratory bidders with three auction formats that make bidding diff...
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Advances in information technology and computational power have opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices. While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions, it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters have ...
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The need for new procurement auction mechanisms that allow for rich bid types such as bundle bids on multiple items has been raised in many situations in industrial procurement. In addition to strategic problems, the design of these combinatorial auctions exhibits hard computational problems. For example, the winner determination typically leads to NP-hard allocation problems in combinatorial a...
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Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that, given the opportunity, sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, non-collusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss “suspicious” behavior as innocuous: In an environment where identical prices ar...
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Previous research of complex-offer auctions designed for deregulated electricity markets finds that offer complexity allows great deal of strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti-competitive and inefficient outcomes. In these smart markets that employ complex-offer auctions, the sellers submit not only quantities and minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also start-u...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1306654