Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Bidding in Sequential Procurement Auctions
We consider the problem of a firm that in each period procures items by participating in auctions and then it sells the acquired items by the end of the period, where any unsold items are salvaged. The objective of the firm is to have a bidding policy that maximizes the expected value of its profit over N auctions. In this model the firm’s valuations derive from the resale of acquired items via...
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We investigate the problem of optimal bidding for a firm that in each period procures items to meet a random demand by participating in a finite sequence of auctions. We develop a new model for a firm where its item valuation derives from the sale of the acquired items via their demand distribution, sale price, acquisition cost, salvage value and lost sales. We establish monotonicity properties...
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When selling a business by auction, investment banks frequently use indicative bids – non-binding preliminary bids – to select a limited number of bidders to participate. We show that if participation is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly-increasing strategies, but bidders “pool” over a finite number of bids, so the highest-value bidders are not a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.05.012