Product liability, entry incentives and market structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Law and Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0144-8188
DOI: 10.1016/s0144-8188(00)00029-6