PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION IN AGRARIAN ECONOMIES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 1982
ISSN: 1464-3812,0030-7653
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041556