Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts

Private Contracts in Two-sided Markets

We study a two-sided market in which a platform mediates between sellers and buyers, and signs private contracts with sellers. We compare this market with (i) a one-sided market with public contracts, and (ii) a two-sided market with public contracts. We find that equilibrium royalties can be positive or negative in a one-sided market with public contracts, are negative in a twosided market wit...

Explain the optimal pattern in the contracts of public private Participation construction, exploitation and transfer (BOT) Applied to Contracts Theory

In recent decade in developing countries, lack of government budget or lack of access to modern technology, persuade governments to attract private sector participation in the economy. One of the most common methods is Public-Private Partnership agreements. The real implementation of this type of partnership needs to set contracts that satisfies preferences of both parties. This research aims t...

Raziel: Private and Verifiable Smart Contracts on Blockchains

Raziel combines secure multi-party computation and proof-carrying code to provide privacy, correctness and verifiability guarantees for smart contracts on blockchains. Effectively solving DAO and Gyges attacks, this paper describes an implementation and presents examples to demonstrate its practical viability (e.g., private and verifiable crowdfundings and investment funds, double auctions for ...

Restricting private-sector practice using contracts.

Relational Incentive Contracts with Private Information

This paper extends Levin’s (2003) relational contract model by having not only the agent’s cost of effort (agent’s type), but also the value of that effort to the principal (principal’s type) subject to i.i.d. shocks. When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types for multiple principal types, it is also pooled across those principal types. When optimal effort separates some agent types...