Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group formation

Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation

In the traditional setup of the public goods game all players are involved in every available group and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. However, in real life situations the group formation of players could be more sophisticated because not all players are attractive enough for others to participate in a joint venture. What if only those players w...

Evolution of Cooperation Driven by Reputation-Based Migration

How cooperation emerges and is stabilized has been a puzzling problem to biologists and sociologists since Darwin. One of the possible answers to this problem lies in the mobility patterns. These mobility patterns in previous works are either random-like or driven by payoff-related properties such as fitness, aspiration, or expectation. Here we address another force which drives us to move from...

Evolutionary Pathways to Group Cooperation: Reputation, Reciprocity, and Signaling

Unbounded indirect reciprocity: Is reputation-based cooperation bounded by group membership?

Article history: Received 24 October 2016 Revised 10 January 2017 Accepted 28 February 2017 Available online xxxx Bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) predicts that people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation with ingroup, but not outgroup, members—and this explains ingroup favoritism in cooperation. We propose that the benefits of maintaining a positive reputation are not limited by gr...

Promoting a Reputation for Quality∗

A firm builds its reputation not only by investing in the quality of its products, but also by controlling the information consumers observe. I consider a model in which a firm invests in both product quality and a costly signaling technology in order to build its reputation, defined as the market’s belief that its quality is high. The signaling technology influences the rate at which consumers...