Promoting cooperation in resource dilemmas: Theoretical predictions and experimental evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2214-8043
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2014.11.007