Proximity Approaches and Design Strategies for Non-Cooperative Rendezvous

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: TRANSACTIONS OF THE JAPAN SOCIETY FOR AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES

سال: 2021

ISSN: 0549-3811,2189-4205

DOI: 10.2322/tjsass.64.136