Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tax policy and present-biased preferences: Paternalism under international capital mobility ¬リニ
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.030