Public reason and multi-layered justice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Having a Reason and Distributive Justice in the Order of Public Reason
In the fi rst part of the paper, Gaus’ ground for the ideal of persons as free and equal is described. Doubts are raised about the appropriateness of the use of his account of this ideal as endogenous to our moral practice. Th e worries are related to the use of the concept of having a reason that Gaus makes in his book, as well as to the aptness of his account of our moral practice from the vi...
متن کاملPublic Reason and Bioethics
1. Rawls puts forward a proposal of political philosophy suitable for a pluralistic society where members try to establish and make persistent a stable social cooperation. The proposal is very sophisticated and takes into consideration numerous elements of a complex society. First of all, it is worth pointing out that the model of society proposed by Rawls is a liberal society, based on the ide...
متن کاملPublic Reason and Moral Bioenhancement
The Rawlsian model of public justification is proposed for the assessment of politics of moral enhancement, in alternative to the neo-republican model proposed in these debates by Robert Sparrow. The central idea of the Rawlsian model of public justification is represented by the liberal principle of legitimacy, although it is extended in relation to the domain that Rawls sees as proper for its...
متن کامل1 The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transnational Legal Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2041-4005,2041-4013
DOI: 10.1080/20414005.2017.1299537