Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Robert Boyd , Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare Coordinated Punishment of Defectors
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متن کاملCoordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare.
Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punish...
متن کاملWhen punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees...
متن کاملEvolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible.
Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of...
متن کاملPunishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible.
It has been argued that punishment promotes the evolution of cooperation when mutation rates are high (i.e. when agents engage in 'exploration dynamics'). Mutations maintain a steady supply of agents that punish free-riders, and thus free-riders are at a disadvantage. Recent experiments, however, have demonstrated that free-riders sometimes also pay to punish cooperators. Inspired by these empi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016