Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a...
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In some auction domains, there is uncertainty regarding the final availability of the goods being auctioned off. For example, a government may auction off spectrum from its public safety network, but it may need this spectrum back in times of emergency. In such a domain, standard combinatorial auctions perform poorly because they lead to violations of individual rationality (IR), even in expect...
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A major challenge in combinatorial auctions is to construct payment rules to make a winner-determination algorithm maximally incentive compatible. A general purpose solution is available only when winner case for reasons of computational complexity or other economic considerations. We propose to use structural SVMs for this pricing problem. The decision boundaries for each target class (with a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0030-364X,1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1110.1024