Qualia realism and representationalism

The article deals with the problem of naturalistic explanation an essential feature all conscious mental states – phenomenal character. conception qualia realism can be considered as one options for a non-naturalistic this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that character experience explained in terms representational content are more acceptable to naturalism. As rule, these discussions, identified non-representational properties paint. author analyzes detail relationship between concepts “qualia” and “mental paint” key work G. Harman. It shown Harman’s argument against fails. He defined paint conception, which contains consequences replace original thesis realism. To attack foundations relevant way, develops A. Kind’s idea epistemic dimension qualia. Kind points out since philosophers arrived at question existence by considering plausibility functionalism, they were so focused on metaphysical considerations forgot phenomenon connected first dimension. On basis this, new version from transparency versus was proposed. demonstrates fails test introspective analysis perceptual experience. Qualia turn theoretical objects do not fulfill their prescribed explanatory function. This undermines arguments reductionist approach consciousness, proceeded assumption referents concept “qualia”. variant representationalism also faces internal problems. In regard, offers option direct realism, well compatible generally consistent attitudes representationalism.