Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
We acknowledge support of National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. We thank Barry O'Neill, Richard Boebel, Jack Ochs and Amnon Rapoport for sharing their data. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar prese...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.007