Quantum English auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Secure Online English Auctions
Security and privacy in online auctions is a major concern as auction participants have many opportunities to cheat (e.g., repudiate bids, not deliver items, etc.). Online auctions such as those used by eBay are based on a type of auction referred to as an English auction. Dispite the English auction being the most popular type of auction, it has received less security coverage than other types...
متن کاملAsymmetric English Auctions Revisited
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium without assuming di¤erentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of ...
متن کاملQuantum Auctions
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entangle...
متن کاملShill Bidding in English Auctions
Shill bidding in English auction is the deliberate placing bids on the seller’s behalf to artificially drive up the price of his auctioned item. Shill bidding has been known to occur in auctions of high-value items like art and antiques where bidders’ valuations differ and the seller’s payoff from fraud is high. We prove that privatevalue English auctions with shill bidding can result in a high...
متن کاملThe effectiveness of English auctions
We study the performance of the English auction under different assumptions about the seller’s degree of “Bayesian sophistication.” We define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation (total surplus). We identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0378-4371
DOI: 10.1016/s0378-4371(02)01533-9