Quantum repeated games revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quantum repeated games revisited
We present a scheme for playing quantum repeated 2 × 2 games based on the Marinatto and Weber's approach [1] to quantum games. As a potential application , we study twice repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We show that results not available in classical game can be obtained when the game is played in the quantum way. Before we present our idea, we comment on the previous scheme of playing quantu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1751-8113,1751-8121
DOI: 10.1088/1751-8113/45/8/085307