Quantum repeated games

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Quantum repeated games

In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners’ dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well. We find a quantum version of this repeated game where the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that both will defect in the second.

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Repeated Games

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This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When agents interact only once, they often have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. In a repeated interaction, however, any mutually beneficial outcome can be sustained in an equilibrium. This fact, known as the folk theorem, is explained under various information structures. This entry also compa...

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for every path a. The corresponding one-shot or stage game is denoted by G = ( {Ai}i=1, { fi}i=1 ) . The usual interpretation is that Ai is a set of pure actions.1 The set of feasible payoff vectors of the stage game G is given by the set F ≡ {p ∈ Rn| f (a) = p for some a ∈ A}. Let F∗ be the convex hull of the set of feasible payoffs. It should be clear that any normalized payoff in the repeate...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Physics Letters A

سال: 2002

ISSN: 0375-9601

DOI: 10.1016/s0375-9601(02)00893-9