Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive...

متن کامل

Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences

In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J.Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 10...

متن کامل

Existence of Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets with Non-ordered Preferences

In this paper we extend the results of recent studies on the existence of equilibrium in finite dimensional asset markets for both bounded and unbounded economies. We do not assume that the individual’s preferences are complete or transitive. Our existence theorems for asset markets allow for short selling. We shall also show that the equilibrium achieves a constrained core within the same fram...

متن کامل

Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences

A fundamental fact in two-sidedmatching is that if a market allows several stable outcomes, then one is optimal for all men in the sense that no man would prefer another stable outcome. We study a related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market where agents enter and search for a mate for at most n rounds before exiting again. Assuming independent preferences, we find that this ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica

سال: 1969

ISSN: 0012-9682

DOI: 10.2307/1909201