Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2951492