Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason)

Given the success of formal approach, within contemporary epistemology, to understanding degreed belief, some philosophers have recently considered its extension challenge intention. According them, (1) intentions can also admit degrees, as beliefs do, and (2) these states are all governed by norms probability calculus, such that rational for belief intention exhibit certain structural similarity. This paper, however, raises worries about (2). It considers two schemes representing intention, casts doubt on applying probabilistic each scheme. And it argues Intention–Belief Consistency Enkrasia cannot plausibly be turned into prescribing a simple correspondence relation between one’s degrees The results suggest potential discrepancy theoretical practical rationality—at least not only interesting questions intention–belief poses new intention-based expressivism normative judgment cognitivism rationality.