Rationality and common knowledge
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rationality and Common Knowledge
Interactive epistemology is the study of the distribution of knowledge among rational agents, usingmodal logic in the tradition of Hintikka (1962) and Kripke (1963), and agent rationality based on the rational actor model of economic theory, in the tradition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954). Epistemic game theory, which is interactive epistemology adjoined to classical ga...
متن کاملCharacterizing Solution Concepts in Terms of Common Knowledge of Rationality
Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known [Aumann 1987; Brandenburger and Dekel 1987]. We show how to get analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium and (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, as a consequence of recent results of Halpern [2009]. Arguably the major goal of epistemic ga...
متن کاملRobust Knowledge and Rationality
In 1995, Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality yields backward induction. In 1998, Stalnaker provided an example of a game in which common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into account, does not yield backward induction. However, in some pertinent situations in this example, players are allowed to forfeit the rationality condi...
متن کاملCommon reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality*
The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision‐making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non‐cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have appli...
متن کاملRobust Knowledge of Rationality
Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example, knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where, unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Sta...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Rationality and Society
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1043-4631,1461-7358
DOI: 10.1177/1043463110375200