Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rationalizability and Epistemic Priority Orderings
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own theories, through strategic reasoning. I develop and characterize epistemically a new solution concept, Selective Rationalizability, which accomplishes this ...
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In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium, there are sparse conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. The basic observation is that, if the actual world belongs to a set of states where the set Z of action pro les is played, each player knows her own payo¤, everyone is rational and it is mutual knowledge that the actio...
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We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny, 1992)...
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We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterization of extensive form rationalizability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalizable if and only if there is a state in which ...
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Conditional re,vriting and priority re,vriting are two recent generalizations of term rewriting systems. In the former, each re\vrite rule is accompanied by an antecedent which must be sho,vn to hold before rewriting can OCCUI. In the latter, re,vrite rules can be used only' in a particular order. We compare these formalisms: neither formalism encompasses the other in a practical sense, but we ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.004