Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te928