Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability

Rationalizable Foresight Dynamics: Evolution and Rationalizability∗

This paper considers a dynamic adjustment process in a society with a continuum of agents. Each agent takes an action upon entry and commits to it until he is replaced by his successor at a stochastic point in time. In this society, rationality is common knowledge, but beliefs may not be coordinated with each other. A rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along...

Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium

In the context of finite normal form games, this paper addresses the formalization and implications of the hypothesis that players are rational and that this is common knowledge. The innovation is to admit notions of rationality other than subjective expected utility maximization. For example, rationality can be defined by the alternative restrictions that preferences are probabilistically soph...

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE...

The Complexity of Nash Rationalizability

The observed choices of a set of players interacting in various related games are said to be Nash rationalizable if there exist preferences for the players that make those choices the pure strategy Nash equilibria for each game. We provide an intuitive characterization of Nash rationalizability under less restrictive conditions than those in the existing literature, and show that this restricte...

Microeconomics B Second Semester 2014 Lecture 2 Dominance , Rationalizability , and Nash Equilibrium