Reasoning About Permitted Announcements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reasoning About Permitted Announcements
We formalize what it means to have permission to say something. We adapt the dynamic logic of permission by van der Meyden [22] to the case where atomic actions are public truthful announcements. We also add a notion of obligation. Our logic is an extension of the logic of public announcements introduced by Plaza [17] with dynamic modal operators for permission and for obligation. We axiomatize...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Philosophical Logic
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0022-3611,1573-0433
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-011-9187-1