Reconciling Candidate Extremism and Spatial Voting

Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences

Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

Given a fixed set of voter preferences, different candidates may win outright given different scoring rules. We investigate how many voters are able to allow all n candidates to win for some scoring rule. We will say that these voters impose a disordering on these candidates. The minimum number of voters it takes to impose a disordering on 3 candidates is 9. For 4 candidates, 6 voters are neces...

Voting Schemes Based on Candidate-Orderings Or

Candidate stable voting rules for separable orderings

We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. We investigate a rule satisfying candidate stability, which is the requirement to deter any candidate from strategic withdrawal. We show that a rule satisfies candidate stability if and only if it satisfies inde...

Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing

We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-votinggame. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium∗ (OSBORNE [1993]) but no – or only very complex – subgame-perfect equilibr...