Reconciling contracts and relational governance through strategic contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0885-8624
DOI: 10.1108/jbim-09-2016-0223